30 July 2018: Alan Davoust

Fair game: how to design social contracts for non-cooperative games ?

 

The Prisoner's Dilemma game is a classic example of a problematic discrepancy between individual incentives and the common good. Where such situations arise in our human societies, we create social conventions and laws to modify these incentives and promote social welfare.

Considering future societies where algorithmic systems will be used to manage such social contracts, we explore the problem of defining moral standards in computational terms and designing social contracts accordingly.  We adopt a game-theoretic model where welfare can be quantified numerically and compared between individuals. In this model we are interested in designing schemes to systematically modify a game's payoffs in order to incentivise moral behaviour.

We explore the problem first in a setting where all utilities are public, then we consider the case where players have private values attached to different outcomes, reflecting subjective properties such as fairness.

Jul 30 2018 -

30 July 2018: Alan Davoust

Fair game: how to design social contracts for non-cooperative games ?

IF 4.31/4.33